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    In 2003, the EPA issued a national water quality 
trading policy to support the development and 
implementation of market-based approaches to water 
quality management.  The EPA advocates water quality 
trading as a cost-effective means to preserve and improve 
water quality (EPA, 2003).  The agency hopes to build on 
the success of air quality trading programs, which have 
been effective in efficiently controlling the emissions of 
compounds responsible for the formation of acid rain.  A 
survey in 2003 found over forty water quality trading 
initiatives across the U.S. and six state policies and 
programs (Breetz, et al., 2003).  These projects vary in 
their stage of implementation, scale, and targeted 
pollutants.   
    Despite the overall success of emissions trading as an 
environmental policy tool, watershed-based nutrient 
trading has failed to generate significant cost savings in a 
number of policy experiments around the U.S.  A 
multidisciplinary team at University of Georgia working 
in the Etowah River Basin is addressing two 
hypothesized reasons for this lack of success: an inability 
to successfully address environmental uncertainty that 
results from trading, and an over-reliance on traditional 





The Upper Etowah River Basin drains an area of 1,050 
square miles supplying water for Lake Allatoona.  A 
comprehensive study of the lake’s water quality 
classified Lake Allatoona as being in transition between 
mesotrophic and eutrophic, with phosphorus (P) being 
the primary limiting nutrient for algal growth (Rose, 
1999).  The authors concluded that unless measures were 
taken to control P inputs to the lake, it would be unfit for 
drinking or recreational purposes.  As a result, the 
Georgia Environmental Protection Division has imposed 
a P load restriction on the lake (GAEPD, 2002).  
Additionally, a total maximum daily load for P has been 
developed for the Little River embayment. 
    In the rural northern part of the watershed there are 
significant areas of agricultural land use.  The main 
agricultural activity is broiler production and a typical farm 
combines this with beef cattle production and pastures.  
Downstream in the more urbanized section of the 
watershed there are eight point sources permitted to 
discharge P.  Comparing the lake load restriction to 
permitted point sources and non-point source loads reveals 
the Etowah River Basin as a potentially ideal system for 





Uncertainty and Trading Ratios 
    Trading activity that involves credits produced from 
reductions in non-point source emissions can result in 
inexact levels of pollutant loading.  Unlike point sources 
where emissions can be monitored with accuracy, 
emissions from a diffuse source, like a farmer’s field, are 
not easily measured.  This uncertainty is compounded due 
to the spatial and temporal distribution of non-point source 
reductions.  
    Uncertainty is being addressed by incorporating a 
stochastic component into the effectiveness of any given 
control measure that is based on actual field measurements 
of nutrient emissions from poultry growing operations.  
These measurements will include a variety of best 
management practices (BMPs) implemented on farms 
draining first-order streams within the Georgia Piedmont.  
The variation in effectiveness of similar BMPs in similar 
settings, relative to appropriate controls, will serve as the 
basis for modeling randomness in actual contributions to 
nutrient loadings.  
    A watershed-scale model will be used to estimate 
phosphorus loads from poultry operations in the watershed.  
These loading estimates along with load estimates from 
other land use categories will be used to scale and route 
loads through the stream system1.  Appropriate trading 
ratios will then be calculated from these results based on 
                                                 
1 Load estimates for other land use types will be taken from 
previous studies in the region and the literature. 
the randomness of improvements produced by the 
controls, the subsequent use of the credits, and the 
required levels of certainty that environmental criteria are 
being met.  We also examine the option of adjusting 
trading ratios ex post if monitoring is able to remove 
uncertainty about the effectiveness of management 
practices.   
 
Trading Structures 
    The second focus of the study is to look at institutional 
options to manage trading.  Trading structures must 
provide adequate oversight to disallow trades that do not 
serve a program’s environmental goals while 
encouraging beneficial trades and keeping transaction 
costs as low as possible.  They must also provide long-
term oversight and adequate compliance procedures to 
ensure that all agreed-on management practices under the 
program actually take place.  We analyze three structures 
with respect to their flexibility and their likelihood of 
success in the Etowah Basin.   
    Common among the early trading programs is the 
market model or bilateral negotiations (Breetz, et al., 
2003).  Under this model, buyers of credits seek out 
sellers and negotiate a trading agreement, with a 
regulatory agency approving the trade and establishing a 
trading ratio (Woodward and Kaiser, 2002).  The buyers 
through monitoring and enforcement establish the 
authenticity of the reductions provided by the sellers.  So 
far this trading model has resulted in only a handful of 
trades because of high information and transaction costs.    
    A second possible trading framework is the market-
maker model, which consists of an association of 
stakeholders, regulators and other interested parties who 
seek out and broker deals between buyers and sellers.  
Sellers can register their credits with the association 
making it much easier for buyers to find them, exchange 
information and negotiate a trade.  However, it is still the 
buyer’s responsibility to prove the reductions are real and 
quantifiable. 
    A less traditional structure is the clearinghouse or fund 
model.  Point sources pay into a fund and in return 
receive credits towards higher emissions.  The managers 
of the fund finance projects to achieve the needed 
reductions.  Clearinghouses eliminate all contractual or 
regulatory links between sellers and buyers (Woodward 
and Kaiser, 2002).  The advantages of this model are 
flexibility to prioritize environmental needs, low 
transaction costs, and the ability to aggregate resources to 
complete innovative, large-scale projects to reduce 
emissions.  The disadvantage of this model is the 
difficulty in setting the price for credits.  If insufficient 
funds are collected to produce the desired environmental 
benefit, the integrity of the riverine system may be 
compromised.  
    The second and third models, if adopted, would require 
significant public investment; therefore, careful attention 
must be paid to the likelihood of success before these 
approaches are recommended.  Our approach to determine 
feasibility will be to gather and analyze data on the 
following: 
• The number of potential buyers and sellers; 
• The relative magnitude of transaction costs among 
the alternatives; 
• Estimates of the costs that a point source would 
incur compared to the cost of buying credits from a 
non-point source; 
• The presence or absence of the expertise to 
manage a fund or watershed association, and the 
degree of trust the stakeholders in the watershed 
have with such managers to make good decisions 
that affect costs and environmental integrity; and  
• The presence or absence of large-scale projects 
that could be facilitated through a fund structure 
better than through the other options. 
  We are in the process of surveying both point source 
dischargers and poultry producers in the watershed to 
identify potential buyers and sellers and to estimate costs.  
An advisory council consisting of stakeholders from the 
watershed will assist us in identifying potential trading 
opportunities, evaluating trading frameworks, and 
determining the best method for communicating to a larger, 





    Making trading part of a successful overall strategy for 
reducing nutrient pollution requires a detailed 
understanding of the effectiveness and variability of the 
nutrient reduction practices available to all parties.  It also 
requires setting up institutions that can provide reasonable 
certainty of meeting environmental goals while also 
providing economic incentives and keeping administrative 
and transactions costs within manageable levels. Our 
approach in the Etowah Basin is based on directly 
incorporating these factors.  We expect to have results to 
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